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Abstract 
Using recently collected firm-level data from Egypt and Tunisia, this paper explores the 
effect of institutional obstacles and corruption on the innovative behavior of firms and their 
effect on firms’ employment growth. We estimate the micro-level interactions between 
corruption and institutional obstacles and test the hypothesis that corruption ‘greases the 
wheels’ of firm performance when bureaucratic procedures are more severe and hampering 
innovation.  Accounting for endogeneity and simultaneity, the paper uses a conditional 
recursive mixed-process model (CMP). The results show that corruption has a direct 
negative effect on the likelihood that a firm is an innovator, but a positive effect when 
interacted with institutional obstacles. This provides support for the hypothesis that 
corruption serves as a mechanism to bypass the bureaucratic obstacles related to obtaining 
the necessary business permits and licenses for product innovation.  These effects also 
resonate into firm growth, through their effect on product innovation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Innovation and technical progress are undoubtedly recognized as key factors for maintaining 
and raising the competitiveness of firms and the main engine for economic growth of national 
economies in the long-term (Grossman and Helpman, 1993; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Romer, 1990).  Differences in innovation and growth performance are often explained by 
differences in institutions and quality of governance, in particular corruption (Mo, 2001; 
Mauro, 1995).  Following the traditional institutional economics theory, corruption raises 
transaction costs and therefore it hinders investment in R&D and other productive activities. 
Additionally, corruption increases the distrust and uncertainty in governmental institutions 
and the business climate in general – both necessary for a conducive environment for 
innovation (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). This negative “sanding the wheels” hypothesis of 
corruption on firm innovation contrasts with the view of some scholars arguing that 
corruption may accelerate innovation, especially in economies with relatively poor quality of 
governance, by speeding up procedures to obtain the needed bureaucratic permits and 
“getting things done”, the so-called “greasing the wheels” hypothesis.   
Macroeconomic studies examining this relationship empirically have raised various 
methodological issues (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Cross-country studies often provide an 
aggregate measure of corruption and innovation, based on the overall perception of experts in 
a given economy, creating possibly a perception bias. Second, macro-economic data do not 
reveal the heterogeneity within a country. Third, macroeconomic studies do not explain the 
detailed mechanisms at the firm-level and consequently may be misleading for policy 
makers. Indeed, it is possible to find a negative effect of corruption at the aggregate level, but 
not at the micro level.  This would occur if bribery payments are a means for firms to 
improve their position relative to those that do not pay bribes, a likely scenario that would 
explain the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon.   
Empirically, at the micro level, only a few studies have addressed the effect of corruption on 
firm performance. This paper tries to fill the gap and empirically investigates to what extent 
institutional barriers and corruption affect the performance of firms in developing economies.  
This study addresses the question of whether corruption “greases” the innovation and growth 
of firms by accelerating bureaucratic procedures, or rather “sands” it by deviating 
investments away from productive activities.  
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The paper uses survey data from Egypt and Tunisia, two countries that are representative for 
the larger Middle East and North Africa
1
 (MENA) region.  Corruption has been persistently 
high in the MENA. In 2015, 83 percent of the MENA countries have scored below 55 in the 
Corruption Perception Index
2
, compared to 23 percent in EU and Western Europe and 74 
percent worldwide (Transparency International, 2015). According to the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey (WBES), the region has the highest levels of corruption with 55.1 percent 
of firms identifying corruption as a major concern
3
. 
The region is also lagging behind when it comes to innovation, compared to other regions at 
the same level of development. According to the Global Innovation Index 2015 (Cornell 
University, INSEAD and WIPO, 2015), the ranking of the MENA countries is as low as 141
st
 
for Sudan, 137
th
 for Yemen and 100
th
 for Egypt and 76
th
 for Tunisia.
4
  Using macro-data from 
various countries, Guetat (2006) has shown that both corruption and poor bureaucratic quality 
depress growth, but are especially detrimental for countries from the MENA region.  A study 
on the micro-level on corruption, innovation and growth is needed to validate and deepen this 
finding and is highly relevant to this part of the world that struggles to implement economic 
reforms and build institutions stimulating innovative knowledge-based entrepreneurship in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring (World Bank, 2013).   
The paper contributes to the literature in various ways.  First, the paper explicitly tests 
whether the effect of corruption on innovation depends on the severity of bureaucratic 
obstacles and red tape. In doing so, it teases out the mediating effects of corruption and 
institutional obstacles affecting economic performance.  Second, the paper provides a better 
understanding of the factors explaining the innovation performance in Egypt and Tunisia.  
The MENA region suffers from a scarcity of firm-level and harmonized cross-country data 
(Atiyas, 2011), especially on innovation activities, making the micro-economics of 
innovation an understudied topic in the MENA.  Therefore, this paper provides new insights 
                                                 
1 This study uses the term “MENA region” to describe the following countries: Djibouti, Egypt, Palestine, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen. The choice of countries is dictated by data availability 
and in accordance to the World Bank’s regional grouping.  
2 A country’s score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0-100, where 0 means 
that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and a 100 means that a country is perceived as very clean. 
3 Out of these firms, 25.2 percent have experienced at least one bribery payment request to accelerate the 
bureaucratic processes, compared to respectively 34 and 17 percent worldwide Enterprise Surveys 
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The World Bank. 
4 From a micro perspective, firms from MENA have the least performance in innovative activities. The region 
has an average capacity utilization of 62.7 percent, a net decrease of labour productivity of 10.5 percent and 
only 5.4 percent of firms are using a technology licensed from a foreign company, compared respectively to 
72.2%, 2.9% and 14.8% for the worldwide average. Source: Enterprise Surveys (ibid). 
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on both the determinants and obstacles to innovation. Most innovation studies describe the 
factors determining the firms’ innovativeness, such as R&D, yet few efforts have focused on 
the barriers hindering innovation. The paper tries to contribute to the literature that adopts the 
barriers approach (e.g. Galia and Legros, 2004; Mohnen and  Rosa, 2001; Wziatek-kubiak 
and Peczkowski, 2010). Nonetheless, in this strand of the literature most of the focus is 
placed on the hampering effect of financial burden and other firms’ characteristics, such as 
firm’s size, age, type of ownership, on innovation, rarely discussing corruption and 
institutional quality. Third, the paper extends the model in order to test for the further effects 
of corruption, bureaucratic quality and innovation on the (employment) growth of firms.  
Finally, the paper uses a novel approach to control for potential endogeneity between 
corruption and innovation using a conditional recursive mixed-process (CMP) model.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section two discusses the literature on the various 
channels by which corruption affects the economic performance of firms and provides 
evidence from previous empirical papers. Section three presents the dataset used in our study 
and the estimation techniques using the CMP model. Section four presents the results of the 
analysis, including some robustness checks. Section five concludes and discusses some 
implications for policy.   
 
2. Conceptual framework and literature review 
 
Innovation is the process by which firms introduce new products, production processes, 
marketing and organizational methods thereby increasing their competitive advantage, 
productivity, efficiency and hence growth potential.
 5
 However, firms do not innovate in 
isolation and successful innovations result from a variety of interactive relationships within 
the national innovation system (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, Joseph and Chaminade, 2009).  
Therefore, the quality of the institutions in the innovation systems affects profoundly the 
innovation outcomes of economic agents, as it defines how skills, artefacts and knowledge 
are created, stored, and transferred (Edquist and Jöhnson, 1997; North, 1990; OECD, 1999).  
                                                 
5 An innovation is the introduction of products, production processes, marketing and organizational methods 
that are new to the firm, irrespective of whether they are new to the firm’s competitors, its market or the world.  
Conceptually this definition follows the OECD (2005) Oslo Manual and is a measure of diffusion of technology 
and knowledge.   
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This aligns with the institutional economics literature, where institutions are meant to reduce 
the uncertainty in human interactions based on rules, norms and values (North, 1990). 
Corruption is commonly defined as the abuse of public power or authority for private benefit 
(Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman and Eden, 2006). Corruption may take the forms of bribery, 
extortion, embezzlement, and fraud (Lambsdorff, 2007). Other economists, such as Andvig 
and Fjeldstad (2000), derive the concept from the principal-agent theory. They define it as the 
exchange of favors between two actors, an agent and a client.  In this paper we define 
corruption as any transaction between profit driven firms and government officials or 
representatives.  Firms pay bribes or informal payments to government officials in exchange 
of a favor that benefits the business performance, such as better or faster government services 
or the securing of contracts.   
Two main strands can be found in the literature with competing and opposing hypotheses 
addressing the effect of corruption on economic performance.  The first set of hypotheses 
suggests that corruption can be considered a major impediment for economic performance. 
The opposing hypotheses suggest that corruption may help bypassing other existing obstacles 
faced by the firm, mainly poor bureaucratic quality.   
 
The Sanding Hypothesis 
 
This strand argues that corruption directly and negatively affects economic performance 
(Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001; Guetat, 2006; Dridi, 2013) by distorting the institutional 
environment in which the firm operates.  We focus here on the arguments related to 
innovative performance.  Beyond the moral considerations, the literature perceives corruption 
as a hindering factor to innovation due to four main arguments (Anokhin and Schultze, 2009).    
First, the decision to undertake an innovative project or business opportunity is heavily 
influenced by the share of the profit that can be appropriated by the firm (Amit and  
Schoemaker, 1993).  When corruption is present, the firm faces an increased risk and 
uncertainty that others may appropriate part of the rents to which the firm beliefs it is entitled, 
reducing the incentive to innovate.   
Second, more generally, any resources allocated to corruption could have been invested in 
R&D, especially in the firms’ early-stage phase.  Corruption thus increases transaction costs 
through bribery payments and efforts to build connections with bureaucrats.  This limits the 
scope of investment in productive activities and reduces the subset of innovative projects that 
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can be commercially exploited.  Higher levels of corruption raise transaction costs and can 
make ‘promising innovative opportunities difficult to commercialize profitably’ (Anokhin 
and Schulze, 2009).   
Third, there is an effect of corruption on the allocation of entrepreneurial talents.  Countries’ 
incentive structure will largely determine whether the better entrepreneurial talents are 
attracted to productive activities such as innovation or on the contrary to unproductive or 
destructive activities such as rent seeking and crime (Baumol, 1990).  In countries where 
corruption is high, the more talented people will be attracted towards more rewarding rent-
seeking activities, develop specialized skills in this area, depressing human capital formation 
for innovation and growth (Murphy et al, 1993).   
Finally, it also affects other important institutions needed to spur innovation.  It erodes 
economic agents’ trust in the government and its related institutions and officials 
undermining innovative investments.  It favors a particular class of people and creates 
inequality in opportunities.  This may frustrate those who do not benefit from privileges in 
the system and lead to social unrest and instability (Mo, 2001).   
 
The “Greasing” effect of corruption 
 
However, some researchers suggest that corruption may positively impact on growth and 
innovation (Leff, 1964; Huntington, 1968, Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998).  Bribery payment 
may lead to more efficient systems in the allocation of business licensing and government 
contracts as only the more efficient firms are able to pay the highest bribes (Beck and Maher, 
1986, Lien, 1986).  And it may reduce market uncertainty for firms by providing them 
informational advantages and lobbying power, providing incentives for investment in 
innovative activity.  
The most often heard arguments, based on work by Leff (1964) and Lui (1985), is that 
corruption is perceived as a factor to overcome other bureaucratic obstacles, even though 
morally undesirable. Bureaucracy and red tape are major barriers to innovation (Damanpor, 
1996), especially in countries with centralized governments (Qian and Xu, 1998). Innovators 
need to obtain special documents and permits in a short period of time in order to secure a 
market advantage in the innovation race (Duncan, 1976; Mahagaonkar, 2008).  Most of the 
studies hypothesizing a positive “greasing” effect of corruption on innovation are based on 
the idea that corruption can counterbalance this negative effect of bureaucratic delay on 
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innovation.  Therefore, some firms will be motivated to pay some additional “informal 
payments” or “speed money” to reduce the time lag involved in many bureaucratic 
procedures (see Fisman and Svensson, 2007).  
 
Evidence from previous studies 
 
The links between corruption and economic performance have been well studied on the 
macro level.  Mo (2001), Dridi (2013) and Guetat (2006) provide quantitative estimates on 
the role of corruption in economic growth,  be it by raising political instability, hampering 
human capital accumulation and private investment (Mo, 2001, Dridi, 2013, Guetat, 2006) or 
by decreasing trust in the ability of the state and market institution to enforce law and trade 
rules (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009).   
These channels also undermine the innovative performance of firms underlying economic 
growth, as innovation fully requires human capital and skills formation, investment in risky 
projects and appropriate institutions including trust and property rights protection (Altenburg, 
2008; DiRienzo and Das, 2014; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008).    
Meon and Weill (2010) test the greasing hypothesis using macro data, and analyse the 
interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption and other dimensions of governance.  
They find that corruption is less detrimental in countries where institutions are less 
ineffective and even positive in countries where institutions are extremely ineffective, 
providing support for the greasing hypothesis.    
Based on a meta-analysis study conducted by Ugur and Dasgupta (2011) on 72 empirical 
studies, there is a stronger direct negative effect in studies with mixed countries than in 
studies focusing on developing countries only.  This is interpreted as supportive for the 
greasing hypothesis of corruption on growth.  Indeed, in developing countries the institutional 
quality is lower, and therefore there is more reason to engage in bribery and informal 
payments to speed up bureaucratic procedures, resulting in a less negative effect of corruption 
on growth.   
Evidence on the greasing effect is less abundant at the micro level.  The majority of 
microeconomic studies test the effect of corruption on performance, but they do not focus on 
the interaction with the severity of other bureaucratic obstacles to test the greasing hypothesis 
explicitly.   
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Fisman and Svensson (2007) find that an increase of one percentage point of the bribery rate 
decreases firm growth by three percentage points. They used as an industry-location bribery 
average in order to control for potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors. 
Mahagaonkar (2008) tests the greasing vs. sanding hypotheses on four different types of 
innovation on 3477 firms from 7 Sub-Saharan African countries. Using IV probit estimates, 
his results support the hypothesis that corruption is a hindrance to product and organizational 
innovation, while it facilitates marketing innovation and doesn’t affect process innovation. 
He uses the bribery amount over annual sales as the main variable to capture corruption. 
Similarly, using a probit estimation on around 2000 Indian firms, Waldemar (2012) finds that 
bribery lowers the level of product innovation, providing evidence for a sanding hypothesis.  
Zhou and Peng (2012) provide firm-level evidence from a cross-sectional dataset of 2686 
firms in 48 countries.  They find that large firms are more likely to engage in strategic 
bribery, while bribery hurts the growth of small firms.  
Using a comparable dataset from Europe and Central and Western Asia and applying a 
recursive model, Habiyaremye and Raymond (2013) found that there is a positive direct 
effect of corruption
6
 on innovation for foreign firms only.  The authors argue that there is a 
long-term loss at the national level due to the practices of foreign companies and the resulting 
disincentive of domestic firms to invest in R&D and product upgrading.   
De Rosa, Gooroochurn and Gorg (2010) use the EBRD and World Bank Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) data, covering Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.  They find that corruption
7
 has a negative 
effect on firm productivity, while lengthy bureaucratic procedures do not affect the 
productivity directly.  The interaction between corruption and bureaucracy has no effects on 
productivity.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
We argue that depending on the severity of institutional and bureaucratic obstacles, the effect 
of corruption on performance may vary.  In line with institutional economics, we contend that 
better quality of institutions and lower levels of corruption are beneficial to innovation and 
growth, in line with the “sanding effect of corruption” hypothesis.  However, in particular 
                                                 
6 Proxied by the bribes from foreign-owned companies to government officials in host countries. 
7 De Rosa et al (2010) define corruption as the occurrence of informal payment request from governmental 
officials to perform an official task. 
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circumstances, when red tape is experienced as very severe and hampering the operations of 
the companies, informal payments may speed up bureaucratic procedures and counterbalance 
the depressing effect bureaucratic procedures have on firm performance.   
Therefore, we believe that the “net impact” of corruption on innovation should be tested by 
disentangling the direct and interaction effects with other business obstacles. This interaction 
will be tested throughout the paper, focusing on one aspect of business obstacles, namely 
bureaucratic procedures.   
 
In the next section we will study these effects, first on firm innovation, measured in different 
ways, and next we will test the effect of innovation, corruption and institutional obstacles on 
firm growth.   
 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
3.1. Data source  
To study the direct and indirect effects of corruption on innovation and firm growth, firm-
level data are used from the World Bank Enterprise Survey consisting of 3,489 firms from 
Egypt (2,897) and Tunisia (592).  This data set is unique as firm-level data in the MENA 
region, especially on innovation, are quite rare (Atiyas, 2011).  Additionally, given the 
secretive and sensitive feature of corruption, firm-level surveys typically lack quantitative 
micro data on corruption. 
The surveys were conducted in 2013 and 2014 under the Enterprise Survey global 
methodology, which ensures that all global variables, sampling, and coverage are 
standardized and fully harmonized across countries (see World Enterprise Survey (2009) for 
details on the population and sampling methodology). This wave of the Enterprise Survey 
includes the innovation module, which builds on OECD's Oslo Manual (2005) guidelines for 
innovation data collection. It distinguishes four types of innovation: whether a firm has 
introduced a new or significantly improved product, production process, marketing strategy 
or organizational method.  
Due to missing values for key variables the sample size is reduced to a total of 1889 firms for 
the main estimation.   
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3.2. Empirical model 
Following the discussion in section 2, our main interest focuses on the effect of corruption on 
innovation and firm growth, and its interaction with other institutional and bureaucratic 
obstacles, to test a sanding versus greasing effect of corruption.  To explain the likelihood 
that a firm is an innovator, our model includes the focal variables corruption (CORRUPT) 
and bureaucratic obstacles (BUR).   We introduce an interaction of 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇 and 𝐵𝑈𝑅 to 
study the potential “greasing effect” of corruption at higher levels of bureaucratic obstacles.  
In addition, a vector of appropriate firm characteristics Xi  is added. Based on the many 
findings discussed in the innovation literature (see Wlademar (2012), Bogliacino, Perani, 
Pianta and Supino (2010) and Mairesse and Mohnen (2007)), the traditional determinants of 
innovation include a set of dummy variables to capture website ownership (𝑊𝐸𝐵), research 
and development activities (𝑅𝐷), foreign ownership (𝐹𝑂𝑅), foreign-licensed technology 
(𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻), formal employee training (𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁) and the educational attainment of the top 
manager (𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑉). R&D is the major input in the production function of knowledge. In 
developing countries, knowledge accumulation often occurs via the acquisition of outside 
knowledge, e.g. through licensed technologies. Employee training and the educational level 
of the top manager capture the human capital that facilitates innovation. Foreign-owned firms 
are generally closer to the technology frontier and better able to innovate. The model also 
takes into account the main characteristics of the firms including firm size, age, and control 
dummies for the geographical location in the major cities of Egypt and Tunisia and for the 
sector of activity. 
Next, we are interested in the effect of corruption and innovation on firm growth. It is 
important to understand the direct effects of corruption on growth as well as its indirect effect 
through innovation (Dridi, 2013).  We therefore estimate a firm employment growth 
equation, explaining growth by innovation and corruption, while controlling for a slightly 
different set of relevant firm characteristics directly related to growth, such as firm size at the 
beginning of the period over which growth is measured and firm age.   
In order to control for any possible endogeneity of corruption in the innovation and growth 
equation we extend our model by adding an equation explaining corruption using, in addition 
to the other exogenous variables, an exclusion restriction that affects innovation only through 
corruption (more on this in section 3.3).    
 
The model can be described as follows: 
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{
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑇𝑖 = 1[𝛼𝑋𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛼𝑍𝑍1𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖 > 0]
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝑖 = 1[𝛾𝑋𝑋2𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍2𝑖 + 𝛾𝐵𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑖 +  𝜀2𝑖 > 0]
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖 =  𝛽𝑋𝑋3𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑉𝑖 +  𝜀3𝑖
 
 
The first equation explains the likelihood that a firm engages in corruption, the second 
explains the probability that a firm is an innovator and the third equation is an employment 
growth equation. The first two equations correspond to probit models, the last equation is a 
simple linear regression.  𝑍1and 𝑍2 are exclusion restrictions that allow to identify the effects 
of corruption (CORRUPT) and innovation (INNOV) on employment growth while BUR 
represents bureaucratic obstacles, and X1 to X3 are vectors of relevant firm characteristics and 
other control variables. We assume the three error terms to be jointly normally distributed. 
Because of the simultaneity, we estimate the three equations by full information maximum 
likelihood combining continuous and discrete endogenous variables
 8
. 
 
3.3. Key variables 
 
We measure innovation (INNOV) using any of the four types of innovation – product 
innovation (PRODUCT), process innovation (PROCESS), organizational (ORG) or 
marketing innovation (MARK) - with an emphasis on product innovation in the main 
specification. The innovation outputs are measured as binary variables since continuous data 
related to innovation
9
 in our dataset are missing for a significant number of observations, and 
in any case only available for product innovations. 
 
Our main explanatory variable of interest is corruption.  CORRUPT measures whether the 
firm perceives corruption as a factor increasing its annual costs. It is captured by the answer 
to the question:  
“Would this establishment’s total annual costs increase, remain the same or decrease over 
the next fiscal year if corruption is no longer an obstacle?” 
The variable takes the value 1 if the firm has answered “decrease” and 0 otherwise.  
 
                                                 
8 The estimation uses the Conditional Mixed Process program developed by Roodman (2011). 
9 A continuous measure of product innovation is the percentage of annual sales accounted for by new or 
significantly improved products. 
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BUR is our proxy for bureaucratic obstacles, and it measures the firm’s perception of the 
difficulty of obtaining business licenses. Innovative firms are considered relatively more 
sensitive to the institutional environment than non-innovative firms (D’Estea, Rentocchinib 
and Jurado, 2010; Savignac, 2006). Hence both the firm’s innovativeness and its perception 
on hindrances (notably institutional and corruption) are linked.  It is indeed imaginable that 
firms that innovate are more likely to need the necessary licenses and permits for the 
introduction of their new products. Therefore they are more likely to experience bureaucratic 
procedures and red tape as more constraining than firms that do not need government services 
in this respect.  Accordingly, innovators might be more inclined to engage in bribing to get 
things done.  Because it is a subjective indicator and we want to control for the tendency of 
innovative firms to complain more, we normalize it relatively to the scores of eleven other 
business obstacles
10
 as follows: 
𝐵𝑈𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 /
∑ 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗
11
𝑗=1
11
. 
It thus represents the perceived difficulty of getting permits and licenses relative to the 
perceived severity of all obstacles.    
 
As exclusion restrictions in the corruption equation, we first choose the AUDIT variable, 
which is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had recourse to external auditors to 
certify and check its annual financial statement. According to Brown, Jappelli and Pagano 
(2009) and Leiponen and Zhang (2010),  being audited indicates a high level of transparency 
and information sharing with external entities. Firms that get audited externally find 
themselves on the horns of a dilemma. They are expected, on the one hand, to exert efforts in 
book-keeping procedures and to share details of their financial transactions with an external 
auditor in a transparent way so as to be eligible to access public services and, on the other 
hand, to enter into contractual agreements with governmental entities with a tendency to be 
forced into corruption (Svensson and Reinikka, 2002). Therefore firms consider corruption as 
a factor increasing their annual costs but with no direct effects on their decision to innovate.  
 
In the same context, the behavior of a firm is definitely affected by the surrounding “rules of 
the game” and set of incentives. Tirole (1996) showed that corruption may spread from one 
segment of the economic agents to the rest of the economy.  Thus, when explaining 
                                                 
10 The choice of obstacles was based on the availability of a sufficient number of observations. The 11 obstacles 
to operations are: electricity; transport; access to land; crime, theft and disorder; finance; tax rates; tax 
administrations; political instability; labor regulations; workforce education and corruption.  
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corruption of a firm, the behavior of other firms should be taken into account. We therefore 
construct and use as second exclusion restriction the dummy variable COMP based on 
whether or not the firm reports one of the following practices by their competitors: 
1- Avoid VAT, sales taxes, labour taxes or regulations, duties, trade regulations.  
2- Have a favoured access to credit or infrastructure services.  
3- Conspire to limit access to markets or supplies. 
 
Table 1 presents the definition of the variables used in the model with their mean value (and 
standard deviation for the continuous variables).  
 
 Table 1  Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean (sd) 
 
 Total Sample 
Egypt 
Only 
Tunisia 
Only 
CORRUPT 
=1 if a firm perceives corruption as a factor increasing 
its costs. 
0.45 0.39 0.68 
PRODUCT 
=1 if a firm has introduced new or significantly 
improved products or services, excluding the simple 
resale of new goods purchased from others and 
changes of a solely aesthetic nature. 
0.24 0.23 0.24 
PROCESS 
=1 if a firm has introduced new or significantly 
improved methods of manufacturing products or 
offering services. 
0.16 0.16 0.17 
ORG 
=1 if a firm has introduced any new or significantly 
improved organizational structures or management 
practices during the past three years. 
0.13 0.11 0.21 
MARK 
=1 if a firm has introduced new or significantly 
improved marketing methods during the past three 
years. 
0.20 0.18 0.27 
GROWTH 
Firm growth measured by the difference of logs of the 
firm’s size at the end of the last fiscal year and three 
years earlier. 
-0.06 
(0.43) 
-0.09 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
BUR 
The difficulty of obtaining business licensing and 
permits on a scale of 0 (when it is not considered as an 
obstacles) to 4 (when it is perceived as a very severe 
obstacle), measured relatively to 11 other business 
obstacles. 
0.62 
(0.84) 
0.69 
(0.89) 
0.33 
(0.56) 
AUDIT 
=1 if the firm has its annual financial statements 
checked and certified by an external auditor in the last 
fiscal year 
0.78 0.78 0.77 
BRIBE 
The percentage of total annual sales, or estimated total 
annual value, paid in “informal payments or gifts” to 
public officials for the purpose of getting things done. 
0.48 
(3.2) 
0.49 
(2.13) 
0.44 
(6.18) 
COMP 
=1 if a firm perceives the conduct of surrounding 
firms as corrupt
11
 
0.62 0.55 0.85 
     
SMALL =1 if the firm's size is between 5 and 20 employees 0.41 0.42 0.37 
                                                 
11 See Sub-Section 3.2. 
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MEDIUM =1 if the firm's size is between 20 and 100 employees 0.38 0.37 0.41 
LARGE =1 if the firm has more than 100 employees 0.21 0.21 0.22 
LOGEMP 
The log of the firm's size (in number of permanent 
full-time employees). 
3.52 
(1.41) 
3.51 
(1.43) 
3.56 
(1.36) 
LOGEMP-3 
The log of the firm's size (in number of permanent 
full-time employees) three years back 
3.58 
(1.40) 
3.60 
(1.41) 
3.53 
(1.36) 
LOGAGE The log of the firm's age (in years). 
2.90 
(0.65) 
2.89 
(0.66) 
2.95 
(0.60) 
FOR 
=1 if the foreign ownership of the firm is larger than 
20 percent 
0.11 0.10 0.15 
FORTECH 
=1 if the firm at present uses technology licensed from 
a foreign-owned company (excluding office software). 
0.08 0.08 0.06 
RD 
=1 if a firm has conducted any Research & 
Development activities 
0.10 0.08 0.18 
TRAIN 
=1 if a firm has conducted any formal training 
programs for its permanent, full-time employees. 
0.18 0.13 0.35 
UNIV =1 if the top manager has at least a university degree. 0.79 0.81 0.71 
WEB =1 if a firm has its own website. 0.53 0.49 0.68 
 
 
4. Estimated Results 
In Table 2 we present the results of the CMP model, estimating the impact of CORRUPT and 
BUR once without their interaction (column 1) and once with an interaction term between 
them (column 2). The correlation coefficients between the three error terms are significantly 
different from zero and justify our concerns of the endogeneity of corruption and innovation. 
In the following sub-sections we discuss the outcomes of each individual equation. 
 
 
4.1. Corruption Determinants 
 
Both sub-columns (1.a) and (2.a) explain the main determinants of corruption and include the 
instrumental variable to control for endogeneity. There are no significant changes in the 
results between the two specifications.  
Our corruption indicator appears to be significantly correlated with the AUDIT instrumental 
variable. This provides supportive evidence for the argument that the high level of 
transparency required to conduct an external audit pushes firms to perceive corruption as a 
liability and does not necessarily prevent it. 
The corruptive conduct of a firm is highly and positively correlated with its perception of the 
integrity of its competitors (COMP), which is aligned with the theory of collective 
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reputations by Tirole (1996). Firms that perceive other competitors as conducting corruptive 
activity are more likely to engage in corruptive activities themselves.   
Other explanatory variables show that the development of a firm’s human capital through 
training has a negative and significant effect on corruption. Neither education nor firm size 
appears to be correlated with corruption. This contradicts with earlier arguments that small 
firms are more harmed by corruption due to their weaker lobbying and negotiation powers.  
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Table 2 Estimated coefficients of the CMP Model  
 (1) 
without interaction 
(2) 
with interaction  
 (1.a) 
CORRUPT 
(1.b) 
PRODUCT 
(1.c) 
GROWTH 
(2.a) 
CORRUPT 
(2.b) 
PRODUCT 
(2.c) 
GROWTH 
Country & Sectors 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AUDIT 0.248***   0.247***   
 (0.092)   (0.0919)   
COMP 0.425***   0.424***   
 (0.080)   (0.079)   
SMALL 0.183 -0.332**  0.183 -0.322**  
 (0.174) (0.143)  (0.173) (0.140)  
MEDIUM -0.023 -0.173*  -0.023 -0.169*  
 (0.130) (0.099)  (0.130) (0.090)  
LOGAGE 0.057* -0.019 -0.171*** 0.057* -0.020 -0.172*** 
 (0.034) (0.041) (0.042) (0.034) (0.041) (0.043) 
WEB 0.255*** 0.153* 0.096*** 0.255*** 0.166** 0.097*** 
 (0.065) (0.079) (0.030) (0.065) (0.079) (0.030) 
TRAIN -0.324*** 0.477*** 0.027 -0.323*** 0.466*** 0.031 
 (0.099) (0.091) (0.035) (0.099) (0.091) (0.034) 
UNIV 0.099 -0.008 0.049* 0.099 -0.003 0.049* 
 (0.076) (0.085) (0.029) (0.076) (0.086) (0.029) 
RD  0.998***   1.009***  
  (0.104)   (0.103)  
FOR  0.191**   0.182*  
  (0.097)   (0.097)  
FORTECH  0.362***   0.349***  
  (0.108)   (0.109)  
BUR  -0.0211   -0.137**  
  (0.038)   (0.056)  
CORRUPT  0.303 -0.341**  0.107 -0.341** 
  (0.190) (0.158)  (0.199) (0.157) 
BUR*CORRUPT     0.273***  
     (0.082)  
LOGEMP-3   -0.141***   -0.141*** 
   (0.0337)   (0.034) 
LOGAGE* 
LOGEMP-3 
  0.0258**   0.026** 
   (0.0107)   (0.011) 
PRODUCT   0.246***   0.229*** 
   (0.0737)   (0.070) 
_cons 0.136 -0.814** 0.802*** 0.135 -0.723** 0.808*** 
 (0.307) (0.333) (0.195) (0.307) (0.333) (0.194) 
rho_12 -.240** 
(0.117) 
-0.230** 
(0.116) 
rho_13 0.565*** 
(0.199) 
0.566*** 
(0.198) 
rho_23 -0.365*** 
(0.112) 
-0.339*** 
(0.108) 
N 1889 1889 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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4.2.Corruption and Innovation 
 
Our main interest is in the effect of corruption and bureaucratic obstacles on innovation 
activities of the firms.  In table 2, we consider only product innovations. Sub-column 1.b 
shows that there are no direct significant effects of corruption and bureaucracy on innovation.   
However, as hypothesized on the basis of the literature, we observe a mediating effect of the 
institutional quality measured by BUR, on the effect of corruption on innovation.  In column 
2.b, by including an interaction term of corruption and bureaucratic obstacle, the magnitude 
and significance of our focal explanatory variables change dramatically. The coefficients of 
bureaucracy become negative and significant, while the coefficient of the interaction term is 
positive and significant.  This means that, while bureaucratic procedures directly decrease the 
likelihood that a firm is innovative, the coexistence of corruption and bureaucratic obstacles 
facilitates the introduction of product innovations. This result suggests an indirect “greasing” 
effect whenever corruption is needed to overcome institutional bureaucratic barriers to 
innovation. 
To interpret the coefficient more meaningfully, we calculated the predicted probabilities of 
being a product innovator at different levels of BUR and for different values of 
CORRUPT, as presented in Figure 1.  By analyzing the effects of corruption (Williams, 
2012) in the model’s specification with interaction, we find that the effect of corruption on 
the probability to innovate increases with the increase of the bureaucratic obstacle. However, 
when there is no obstacle, the effect is not significant.  
For instance, if the firm perceives bureaucracy in getting permits and business licenses twice 
as severe as the rest of other operational obstacles (i.e. BUR=2), corruption will increase the 
probability to innovate by 16.6%.  
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Figure 1: Predicted probability of product innovation (pr(PROD)), at different levels of 
bureaucratic obstacles (BUR) and different values of corruption (CORRUPT) 
 
 
Interestingly, by analyzing such interactions at different values of the bureaucratic obstacles 
BUR, we find that the probability to innovate increases for firms engaged in corruption 
(CORRUPT=1) at higher levels of severity of bureaucratic obstacle, ranging from 25.3 
percent probability of innovation when BUR is reported at its minimum level
12
 to 46.3 
percent when BUR it is at its maximum level with a confidence level of 95%.  In contrast, 
when CORRUPT equals zero, i.e. if the firm is not engaged in corruption, the probability to 
innovate will go from 22.6 percent to 9.6 percent as bureaucracy (BUR) takes higher values. 
It is important, nevertheless, to mention that the net effect of CORRUPT gets statistically 
insignificant at 95% level of confidence when the BUR variable is less than 0.9. This means 
that corruption has no significant impact on innovation for firms that suffer less from 
bureaucratic obstacles.  
 
This positive interaction term supports our greasing hypothesis. A major amount of time 
spent on corruptive activities is directed to ease bureaucratic barriers and “get things done” 
                                                 
12 The minimum level of bureaucracy (0) would indicate that the firm has found that the obstacle of getting a 
business license or permit is the least important relative to the other 11 business obstacles in the dataset. 
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for firms to allocate more time and effort on innovative activities. However, if the firm 
doesn’t suffer from major bureaucratic constraints, expenses allocated to corruption have no 
clear effects on innovation.  Notice that the positive marginal effect of corruption on 
innovation includes the interaction term between corruption and bureaucracy.   
By calculating the average marginal effect of other explanatory variables of interest we found 
that, as expected, foreign technology has a positive and significant impact on product 
innovation indicating that firms owning foreign technologies are 8.7% more likely to 
introduce new products or services. Likewise, if a firm has foreign ownership higher than 
20%, it will have a 4.5% higher probability to introduce a product innovation.  
The results show that knowledge accumulation through R&D, formal training programs for 
employees and advanced usage of ICT are positively and significantly correlated with 
product innovation. This supports the importance of these conventional innovation 
determinants in developing new products, regardless of the industry and location of 
operation.  
The size of the firm is very significant in explaining innovation. The larger the firms the more 
likely they are to introduce new products (see column 1 of appendix table 1).  
The level of education of the top manager is not correlated with product innovation. This 
finding is somewhat unexpected, as education is in most studies found to be positively 
correlated with product innovation, (Habiyaremye and Raymond, 2013; Krastanova, 2014). It 
shows that product innovation in developing countries of the MENA region is of an 
incremental type that does not necessarily involve complex processes requiring higher level 
of knowledge and absorptive capacity.  
Also validating our hypothesis, product innovation is less common in the traditional rentier 
sectors that contribute to a wide portion of the economy of MENA, such as tourism (proxied 
by Hotels and Restaurants), construction and real estate, refined petroleum products, and 
plastics, rubber and non-metallic minerals.  This finding is derived from the estimated 
sectoral marginal effects
13
 and the descriptive statistics per sector (see appendix table 2).  
 
The results of the employment growth equation are presented in Table 2, columns 1.c and 2.c.  
Again, the results do not differ much between the two specifications.   
Results from the third equation also show that, as expected, innovation has a positive and 
significant effect on growth.  This is in line with other studies that find that innovation is a 
                                                 
13 Results are available upon request. 
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major determinant for the growth and high growth of firms (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 
2010, Coad and Rao, 2008).   
The results show that corruption seems to have a direct negative effect on growth, as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of the corruption variable.  This is in line 
with the findings of Ugur and Dasgupta (2011).  However, from the previous discussion we 
also observe a positive indirect effect of corruption on employment growth through its impact 
on innovation.  Appendix table 1, part B, column 1 reports the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on employment growth. Results show that the positive indirect impact 
of corruption on employment growth (0.07*0.09) is outweighed by the direct negative one (-
0.137). The occurrence of corruption is estimated in total to decrease the growth of 
employment by 13%. 
The other covariates have the expected sign and significance.  Smaller and younger firms 
grow faster, but the relationship is non-linear.  Firms connected through a website, and firms 
managed by higher educated managers also exhibit higher growth rates by 3.3 and 2.1 
percentage points respectively.  
 
We have also estimated our model on the other 3 types of innovation, namely process 
innovation, marketing and organizational innovation. The results are also presented in 
Appendix Table 1, in Part A column (2) to (4) for innovation and Part B column (2) to (4) for 
employment growth; marginal effects are shown.  We found that the indirect greasing effect 
through innovation exists for all types of innovation and that the direct sanding effect varies 
between 11.7% for organizational innovation and 13.3% for product innovation. The result 
indicates that the sanding effect is more apparent in the type of innovation in which other 
stakeholders and government officials are typically more involved. This is indeed an 
interesting argument to be tested more deeply in the future.   
In order to test the robustness of our results, we still applied another corruption variable using 
the BRIBE variable (as defined in table 1). This estimation showed that an increase of one 
percentage point of the bribery level over annual sales, when bureaucratic obstacles are twice 
as severe as other obstacles (at BUR=2), raises the probability to innovate by 0.4%. Again we 
found a greasing effect of bribery on innovation and a sanding effect in total on employment 
growth.  
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
The question of corruption has received a lot of attention in both the political debate and 
macro-economic studies recently. However, the effect of corruption on innovation in firms is 
after all not widely explored in the micro-economic literature. This paper provides some 
novel insights about the effects of corruption on innovation and employment growth in the 
MENA region, using evidence from Egypt and Tunisia.  
 
In addition to serious ethical considerations, it can be argued that corruption directly hinders 
innovation by reducing the overall trust in the market and the national innovation system and 
by channelling investments away from productive projects. Both effects depress the 
likelihood that firms innovate.  However, we have shown that an interaction may exist 
between corruption and other institutional obstacles.  Potentially innovative firms may be 
tempted to use corruptive practices to overcome the institutional obstacles to innovation they 
face. Our study finds supportive evidence that corruption indeed interacts with and reduces 
the negative effect bureaucratic red tape has on innovation.  In sound business environments, 
corruption –as a pragmatic tool to overcome bureaucratic obstacles– loses its importance and 
appears to have a negative or no effect on product innovation. The findings of our study 
validate studies in the macroeconomic literature where corruption is less negatively 
correlated with growth in countries with weak governance efficiency. Despite this greasing 
effect of corruption in innovation, the sanding effect dominates when it comes to employment 
growth.   
 
The policy implications of these findings are evident.  In the first place, corruption should be 
fought for ethical reasons, as the system is based on abuse of power and seriously affects the 
overall trust in the government, leading to social unrest, disinvestment and leaks in the 
national welfare.  Second, innovation should be triggered by sound innovation policies.  In 
many MENA countries only few rigorous innovation policies have been put in place (World 
Bank, 2013). Therefore, policy makers are highly advised to undertake serious measures to 
spur innovative activities within firms, for instance by eliminating the different institutional 
barriers which open the door for rent-seeking behaviour and are hindering innovation, growth 
and job creation. Inducing more innovation-friendly and transparent business licensing 
procedures can be done by enforcing, for instance, e-government services, which are 
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designed to accelerate the time spent in processing governmental services, eliminating 
unnecessary intermediaries and inducing a fair access to information and services. Such 
policies should also focus on peripheral areas which have high potential for innovation and 
not be privileged to firms based in capital cities only.   
 
Despite the sound results, the analysis has some limitations. We have tackled the simultaneity 
of corruption and innovation by adding to our model a structural equation explaining 
corruption. Because of the cross-sectional nature of our data we cannot examine dynamics 
and run a Granger causality test to find out whether it is corruption that influences innovation 
or whether it are innovative enterprises that tend to be corrupt.  Another important limitation 
of our research is that the data set that we used for the analysis does not include any informal 
establishments or firms with less than five employees. This is the main shortcoming of the 
dataset since the level of informality and the presence of microenterprises are abundant in the 
MENA economies
14
. Accordingly, there is a room for further research in this area. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Marginal effects of covariates on innovation and firm growth 
Part A: Average Marginal Effects on Innovation 
INNOV:  
 
Product Process Marketing Organizational  
RD 0.250*** 0.203*** 0.230*** 0.145*** 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) 
UNIV -0.0001 -0.006 0.020 0.016 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) 
SMALL -0.079** -0.033 -0.060 -0.125*** 
 (0.035) (0.029) (0.038) (0.025) 
MEDIUM -0.044* -0.006 -0.018 -0.060*** 
 (0.0247) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) 
LOGAGE -0.006 -0.006 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
FOR 0.046* 0.055*** 0.016 -0.005 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) 
WEB 0.044** 0.029* 0.043** 0.049*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) 
TRAIN 0.115*** 0.076*** 0.130*** 0.075*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
FORTECH 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.059** 0.061*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) 
BUR -0.001 0.0077 0.0003 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
CORRUPT 0.0703 0.076* 0.103* 0.096** 
 (0.049) (0.041) (0.056) (0.045) 
Part B: Average Marginal Effects on Growth 
     
UNIV 0.021** 0.022** 0.018* 0.019* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
LOGAGE -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
WEB 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
TRAIN 0.009 0.018 0.007 0.0057 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
CORRUPT -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.130** -0.132** 
 (0.0503) (0.047) (0.059) (0.053) 
LOGEMP-3 -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
INNOV 0.090*** 0.064** 0.095** 0.133*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.037) (0.022) 
     
N 1889 1889 1889 1889 
Note: Average marginal effects are calculated from the model including the interaction term between 
CORRUPT and BUR, as in the right side panel of table 2 for product innovation.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of innovation and corruption variables per sector of activity 
Sector PRODUCT PROCESS ORG MARK CORRUPT 
Food & Tobacco (N=165) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.28 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.52 
sd 0.45 0.39 0.36 0.42 0.50 
Textiles, Garment & Leather (N=361) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.31 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.47 
sd 0.46 0.42 0.33 0.38 0.50 
Wood, Paper and Publishing (N=96) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.29 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.50 
sd 0.46 0.41 0.26 0.35 0.50 
Refined Petroleum Products and Chemical 
(N=92)  
   
 
Mean 0.24 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.45 
sd 0.43 0.35 0.34 0.41 0.50 
Plastics, rubber and Non-metallic miner (N=110) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.48 
sd 0.39 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.50 
Basic metals & Fabricated metal product 
(N=218)  
   
 
Mean 0.22 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.40 
sd 0.42 0.35 0.25 0.36 0.49 
Motor Vehicles, Other Transport Equipment 
(N=2)  
   
 
Mean 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
sd 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Furniture and Recycling (N=61) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.26 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.44 
sd 0.44 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.50 
Services of motor vehicles (N=38) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.26 0.55 
sd 0.41 0.34 0.16 0.45 0.50 
Construction (N=95) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.33 
sd 0.42 0.35 0.39 0.45 0.47 
Wholesale (N=117) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.25 0.59 
sd 0.30 0.29 0.40 0.43 0.49 
Retail (N=79) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.52 
sd 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.38 0.50 
Hotel and Restaurants (N=111) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.21 0.45 
sd 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.41 0.50 
Transport and Supporting Transport Activities 
(N=161)  
   
 
Mean 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.32 
sd 0.32 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.47 
Post, telecommunication and IT (N=12) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.42 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.17 
sd 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.39 
Other - non-specified (N=171) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.33 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.47 
sd 0.47 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.50 
Total (N=1889) 
 
   
 
Mean 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.45 
sd 0.42 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.50 
 
